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sophical thought experiments is sometimes 
questioned. One possible line is to insist that 
thought experiments are only valuable when 
they lead to actual empirical experiments. 
This is what happened with the Einstein-Po-
dolsky-Rosen (EPR) thought experiment, 
which attempts to explain away the “spooky 
action at a distance” phenomenon (as Ein-
stein called it) of quantum entanglement. If 
we measure, say, the spin of an electron in a 
system that consists of two electrons travelling 
in different directions, this apparently has an 
immediate effect on the other electron in the 
system. This is the case even though the two 
electrons are seemingly independent of each 
other and could even be miles apart; thus the 
“spooky action at a distance”.  
The thought experiment is presented in the 
form of a paradox: quantum mechanics sug-
gests that information between the two elec-
trons can travel faster than light, but this 
would appear to violate the Special Theory of 
Relativity. The upshot is that because of the 
paradox, there must be something more to re-
ality than the standard quantum theory sug-
gests. Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen explained 
the phenomenon by introducing “hidden vari-
ables”: some unknown local properties of the 
system that should account for the paradoxi-
cal result.  
The thought experiment was presented in 
1935. It was only after John Bell’s 1964 work 
that the thought experiment eventually led to 
real experiments, and it is generally thought 
that these confirmed standard quantum theo-
ry rather than the hidden variable theory that 
Einstein favoured. It seems reasonable to say 
that the EPR thought experiment was valuable 
regardless of this. If this is the case, thought 
experiments can be valuable while failing to 
correspond with actual reality; that is, thought 
experiments by themselves do not need to be 
a reliable guide towards how things are in the 
actual world.  
However, thought experiments that do not 
relevantly correspond with the actual world 
might not appear to be very interesting. But 
the goal of philosophical thought experiments 
is clearly different – it would seem that it is 
enough if the thought experiment describes 
a (metaphysically) possible scenario. Now, it 
should be immediately noted that one area 
of debate with regard to many philosophical 
thought experiments is exactly whether they 
are possible – or indeed even conceivable. 
These are exactly the kind of thought exper-
iments that the Scientific Inquisition typical-
ly targets. One example, mentioned also by 
Unger, is Donald Davidson’s Swampman. This 
doppelgänger thought experiment produced a 
heated debate in the philosophy of mind.  
Your Swampman doppelgänger is a mole-
cule-for-molecule physical duplicate of you 
produced by a freak chemical reaction gener-
ated by a lightning strike and swamp gas. The 
question is whether your physical duplicate is 
also mentally identical to you. Opinions are 
divided, with one side insisting that of course 
the duplicate is also mentally identical and 
the other side claiming that something would 
be missing – perhaps the duplicate would be 
a phenomenological “zombie” lacking con-
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Tuomas E. Tahko finds a place where metaphysics and science meet 
It is tempting to start a discussion about what 
metaphysics is or should be by making clear 
what metaphysics is not. Professional philoso-
phers frown when they see the word “meta-
physics” being associated with crystals, en-
chanted spell candles, and incense. Even at 
distinguished bookstores the “Metaphysics” 
section is dominated by astrology, auras and 
chakras, freemasonry, even Rosicrucianism. 
Scientifically-minded philosophers engaged in 
metaphysics certainly have nothing to do with 
any of this.  
But what if we turn the picture upside 
down? Recently, metaphysicians have been 
fighting off a kind of Scientific Inquisition, a 
line of thinking in contemporary philosophy 
that aims to convert us all to naturalism and to 
denounce the false gods of intuitions, a priori 
reasoning, and thought experiments. (If you’re 
looking for an example of the Scientific In-
quisition in action, Peter Unger argued in this 
magazine that typical philosophical thought 
experiments produce nothing but “Empty 
Ideas”, TPM 57.) Perhaps the Scientific Inquis-
itors are right. There are probably many de-
bates in metaphysics that are based on dubious 
intuitions or fantastic – should I say magickal 
– thought experiments. But we shouldn’t for-
get that the actual Inquisition also attacked 
Galileo, whose scientific methods were, at 
that time, regarded as at least as dubious as 
metaphysical thought experiments are now. 
Nobody expects the Scientific Inquisition to 
undermine central scientific methods! 
Galileo is of course a particularly nice exam-
ple because thought experiments were a cru-
cial part of his methodology: Galileo is said to 
have refuted the Aristotelian theory of motion 
(heavier bodies fall faster than lighter ones) by 
means of a thought experiment rather than an 
actual empirical experiment. The refutation is 
simple. Just consider a cannon ball and a ten-
nis ball that are attached together via string; 
according to Aristotle’s theory, the combina-
tion of these objects should fall faster than 
the cannon ball alone. But it should also fall 
slower, since the light tennis ball is supposed 
to slow down the heavy cannon ball. This is 
a contradiction, which shows that Aristotle’s 
views about motion are suspect, and no one 
actually needs to drop a cannon ball or a ten-
nis ball to find out.  
Here is how I see the relationship between 
metaphysics and science. Both are in the busi-
ness of studying reality; they share the same 
subject matter. However, their respective 
methods seem to be different, given the appar-
ent lack of empirical research in metaphysics. 
The obvious question is: how could we possi-
bly study reality without using empirical meth-
ods? The answer should be equally obvious: 
we can employ the very same methods used 
by Galileo and the vast majority of scientists 
both before and after him.  Both philosophy 
and science make use of thought experiments. 
It is important to realise that there is more to 
scientific methodology than empiricism. 
The similarity of scientific and philo-
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ture (XYZ not H2O) but all the same macro-
physical features – is a case in point. We could 
certainly never test this, because it’s plausible 
that there is only one molecular structure 
that produces exactly the same set of chemical 
properties that water actually has. So it’s phys-
ically impossible that XYZ could produce the 
same chemical properties as H2O. I think the 
Scientific Inquisition would be right to ques-
tion some of the speculation that followed 
Putnam’s work, exactly because of the lack of 
scientific detail in this discussion. At the same 
time, I think it’s quite clear that this thought 
experiment, and others, have been extremely 
valuable. Let me briefly explain why. 
There is a hidden assumption underlying the 
Twin Earth thought experiment, one that is 
not entirely clear in Putnam’s philosophy. This 
assumption is that what makes water water is 
precisely its microstructural composition. In 
other words, it is simply assumed that the boil-
ing point of water, its ability to dissolve salt, 
the surface tension of water and so on can be 
explained in terms of the molecular structure 
of water. It’s true that chemistry and physics 
can give us a good idea about the microstruc-
tural basis of these properties of water. But in 
order to establish the metaphysical results that 
are typically associated with the Twin Earth 
thought experiment, something much stron-
ger is needed: we need to show that micro-
structure determines macrostructure with a 1:1 
correlation. Only then could we confirm that 
H2O – and only H2O – produces the chemical 
properties we know and love. Only then could 
we conclude that chemical substances ought 
to be defined in terms of their microstructure. 
It turns out that the story I’ve just told is 
controversial: scientists are happy to exploit 
the chemical properties of various chemical 
substances, but they might hesitate to commit 
to the thesis concerning microstructural deter-
mination that I’ve just outlined. So it would 
appear to be a philosophical thesis. Putnam 
did not discuss the scientific details of this 
thesis, but my suggestion is that here we are 
exactly at the interface of metaphysics and sci-
ence. If this is where the Scientific Inquisition 
wants to push us, I am willing to follow – we 
need empirical work to get to such results. Yet, 
remember that this was all spurred on by a dis-
tinctively philosophical thought experiment.  
Of course, I have given you merely a 
glimpse of the relevant scientific work; there is 
much more to this story. But I have only hoped 
to show that by starting from intuition-driven 
thought experiments, which are still at the 
heart of analytic metaphysics despite their 
apparent flaws, we can arrive at a place where 
metaphysics and science must meet and can 
do so in a fruitful manner. 
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scious experience. These two very different 
intuitive reactions are empirically untestable. 
The upshot is that the doppelgänger thought 
experiment produces irredeemably contradic-
tory conclusions, even among experts. Perhaps 
the doppelgänger thought experiment is a bad 
one, and the Scientific Inquisition is right to 
rid us of such intuition-mongering. After all, 
it does not seem to have inspired any actual 
experiments, contrary to the scientific ones. 
Incidentally, it is now 29 years since Da-
vidson introduced us to Swampman. Bell’s 
theorem, which resulted from the experiments 
inspired by the EPR thought experiment, was 
introduced exactly 29 years after the EPR 
thought experiment. Should we conclude that 
if a thought experiment hasn’t inspired any 
real experiments within 30 years of its incep-
tion, then it’s worthless? How long should we 
wait?  
These are clearly the wrong questions. There 
are thought experiments that obviously have 
value even though they could never produce 
real experiments. Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth 
thought experiment – where we imagine a 
world where water has a different microstruc-
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